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The conventional picture of North-East Asian security is of stark national security threatscaused by the alleged menacing behaviour of a highly militarized, nuclear-armed DemocraticPeople’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). Not only does this picture obscure the
profound human security crisis facing many North Koreans, mis-analysing of regional security problems
also contributes to the prevalence and circulation of a fundamentally flawed “conventional wisdom”
about what constitutes the security crisis for North-East Asia and consequently what can be done
about it. It therefore precludes fruitful policy choices that could help to resolve the multidimensional
Korean security crisis that is at the heart of short-, medium- and long-term regional stability.
One reason for the prevailing truncated picture of North-East Asian security is that to consider
the more complex, real regional security crisis makes for uncomfortable reading for many of the elites
in the region or indeed for extra-regional elites with regional concerns. It would mean making visible
what have become almost taboo subjects in terms of their lack of coverage in the international media.
These include the absence of a military threat to the region from North Korea, the real risks to regional
stability from transborder spill-overs of unregulate d capitalism in the DPRK, and the regionally held
fear of unilateral US military intervention in North Korea.
Security discourses
Security debates these days are often categorized in mutually exclusive terms as either concerning
national security or human security. National security analysts and policy makers worry about territorial
integrity and military defence of state borders. They regard “security” as the domain of sovereign
states. The international is inherently conflictual and in the end states must rely on their own resources
to defend themselves and protect their citizens.
Human security analysts, on the other hand, argue that for most states, security no longer means
only the protection of borders against invasion. It also implies protection against social and economic
instability caused by disruption from outside the territorial borders. Human security analysts feel that
in this globalizing world of porous borders and easy travel we should be more concerned about
transborder threats to individual well-being. These may come, for example, from economic downturns,
humanitarian and environmental disasters, or transnational crime. Human security concerns normally
also imply a sense that one state can no longer—if it ever could—resolve such problems on its own.
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Asian bird flu, for instance, is not just a problem for Thailand or Viet Nam or even just for Asia. Human
security analysts prefer therefore to respond to human security threats by way of regional and/or
global institutions. These institutions offer multilateral solutions designed, in the main, to be implemented
through cooperation, not coercion.
National security and human security analysts have not been
very good at incorporating each other’s perspectives such as to offer
multisectoral analysis. There is nothing in logic or in practice, however,
to prevent a national/human security nexus as the basis for analysis
and plenty to recommend it in terms of an increased ability to
appreciate the complexity of contemporary security crises. National
security concerns in terms of the potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or terrorism
against civilians should in fact remain the most basic of human security concerns. By contrast, there are
few who would argue that simple territorial stability accompanied by the abrogation of basic political
and economic rights offers any kind of meaningful national security to citizens, the regime that rules
over them or neighbouring countries that must deal with legal and illegal migration and all manner of
negative, unpredictable cross-border spill-over effects.
National and human security discourses can also be reconciled through policy choices that push
for multinational solutions to global problems. After all, even in the hardest of security cases when
military intervention is mooted, most states (including those often conceived of as diehard unilateralists)
value multilateral solutions—whether this be through NATO, or the UN and regional peace-keeping
forces. This is why the United States has sought to achieve multilateral backing for every international
intervention it has made since the Second World War and why China has insisted that only multilateral,
preferably UN-sanctioned, interventions are legal.
The prevalence and influence of the conventional security discourse
The dominant international security debate about North-East Asia focuses on North Korea as the
source of most of the region’s troubles. The discourse is on WMD including ballistic missiles and
nuclear armaments, and of military threats by North  Korea against its neighbours. It is commonly
believed that there remains the ever-present threat of war caused by an irrational state and government
in the DPRK. If human security concerns are mentioned in the context of North-East Asia they are
invariably discussed in regard to North Korea’s human rights violations. Humanitarian concerns are
discussed in the context of the food crisis in North Korea and the consequent inability of the government
to feed its people. Transnational crime and trafficking in women also come on to the agenda of the
region’s media through the prism of alleged North Korean misdemeanours.
Conventional security discourse on and in North-East Asia is of North Korea as the major source
of a military security dilemma. Seen in this way, human insecurity is a direct consequence of the
militarization of the DPRK and that government’s political intransigence and antiquated economic
policies. The implication is that once the DPRK military problem is resolved such that the DPRK no
longer poses a security threat to the region, then human security problems for North Koreans and
neighbouring populations will be solved as an automatic consequence. Human security threats are
not, within this conventional security picture, understood as a common problem for all of North-East
Asia—transcending borders and requiring common and cooperative solutions.
Conventional security talk is also pessimistic about the possibilities of achieving multilateral or
cooperative solutions to the perceived security dilemma of North-East Asia. North-East Asia is known
for its comparative absence of regional organizations. Recent years have seen some promotion of the
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idea of a North-East Asian community but there remains no appetite for a European Union-type
integration venture in East Asia—even in the distant future. The conventional wisdom is that it is
difficult to perceive common interests and culture such as to place regional integration on the agenda
for any North-East Asian state. Nor is North-East Asia home to even a loose association of states
analogous to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which operates by putting aside
ideological and economic disparity in order to formulate common approaches to shared concerns.
The dominant or conventional security discourse is influential globally, informing the foreign
policies of major states—including the United States, Japan and all Western states from the European
Union members to Australia and New Zealand. Its analysis permeates ASEAN members even if these
states do not share the policy options of isolation and containment that have sometimes flowed from
the dominant analysis. ASEAN prefers its own distinct method of conflict resolution and negotiation to
achieve elite consensus and cooperative solutions.
The dominant approach is by no means universal, however, and obscures more complex intra-
regional security dynamics. In China, for instance, the major North-East Asian security debate is not
about North Korea, but about the perceived threat to the region from Taiwanese independence claims.
Other concerns highlighted throughout the region although barely mentioned in the western media
are the still extant territorial conflicts, regional rivalries and ideological differences between North-East
Asia’s major states—China, Russia, Japan and both Koreas. The bitterness engendered by the Japanese
colonial period of the first half of twentieth century is still prevalent and a significant factor in domestic
politics in China and both Koreas. Ideological differences between communist China and capitalist
Japan still play a part in fear, suspicion and mistrust between the two peoples. Nationalist sentiments
also motivate Chinese, Japanese, Korean and to a lesser extent Russian irredentist claims in the region.
The conventional approach tells part of the truth but it does so in such a way as to obscure other
important truths for those concerned with North-East Asia. Conventional approaches reduce knowledge
about complex security problems to a “one cause fits all” diagnosis that demonizes the DPRK and
makes it almost impossible to conceive of negotiating, let alone reaching any agreement, with such an
irrational state. Conventional knowledge about the DPRK also presents worst-case scenarios as factual
accounts. The conventional wisdom does anything but provide wise guidance for policy makers. Instead
it exaggerates and skews data in such a way as to aggravate—rather than merely analyse—security tensions.
Some “taboos”
Articulating some of the taboos—the issues that are known by
all regional policy makers but rarely mentioned—is a first step to
reconstituting security analysis in and about the  region. A
reconstitution of the conventional wisdom should be the aim—to
try to force a belated recognition that the current security policies of
major states are based on or informed in important ways by a
dangerously deficient understanding of North Korean realities and
therefore build policy on deeply problematic foundations.
THE DPRK IS A MILITARILY WEAK PO WER
It may seem obvious, even logical, that the DPRK, which has suffered well-recorded economic
devastation for over fifteen years and as a consequence almost total industrial infrastructural collapse,
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would have little
in  the  way o f
f u n c t i o n i n g
military hardware
or a  ve ry
fearsome army.
Nevertheless, the
c o n ve n t i o n a l
wisdom is that the
DPRK has a
fearsome arsenal, ready to be released on all comers from Tokyo to Alaska with South Korea in-
between. Table 1 starkly reveals the actual capacity of the DPRK military.
The DPRK’s annual military spending is dwarfed by its neighbours, at 2 billion US dollars, compared
to Japan’s 44 billion and South Korea’s 12 billion. In addition, the US$ 95 per capita it spends on its
huge armed forces has to cover food, clothing, housing, health supplies, as well as every aspect of what
would normally come from a civilian infrastructure in a developed state—telecommunications, transport,
food supplies and agricultural production, and industrial production for everything from weapons to
clothing. This is because the social infrastructure barely functions and the civilian industrial fabric has
all but disappeared since the economic meltdown of the 1990s. Additionally the data in Table 1
assume a formal exchange rate that in practice has been replaced by market rates since at least the
mid-1990s. In 2000 the market rate for the won was conservatively 25 won per dollar—as compared
to the 2.2 official rate. Taking this conservative market rate as the actual rate, DPRK per capita
expenditure on it soldiers in 2000 was actually around US$ 8 a year. This expenditure is not enough
to make for a powerful army.
The incapacity of the North Korean army provides an important reason as to why the DPRK is
seeking to build or declare a nuclear deterrent. If successful, relatively cheap investment in nuclear
fission would mean the DPRK would not have to find billions of dollars to support its hungry and
economically unproductive army. The strategy does not even require the actual production of a nuclear
weapon. The February 2005 announcement by the DPRK that it had “manufactured nukes for self-
defence” may or may not be true. The DPRK has not, however, completed any nuclear-weapons
testing, and the backward state of every aspect of its economy would indicate that the DPRK’s claims
are both aspirational and designed to bring the US into substantive negotiations to exchange its nuclear-
weapons programmes for economic assistance.
No serious military analyst anywhere in the world views the DPRK as an offensive military threat
to its neighbours or any other state. This is partly because of the weak military capacity of the DPRK
and partly because of the lack of a military strategy that argues for either offensive attack against its
neighbours or pre-emptive defence.
THE DPRK HAS NO  LINKS WITH GLOBAL TERRORISM
Despite its involvement historically in terrorist attacks against South Koreans such as the Rangoon
bombing of South Korean politicians in 1983 and its alleged blowing up of a South Korean airline in
1987 as well as its abduction of thirteen Japanese civilians in the 1970s and early 1980s, the DPRK
does not have any recent or current connections with global terrorism. Its dramatically improved
relationship with South Korea since the June 2000 Summit in Pyongyang (when North and South
Korean leaders met for the first time since the end of the Korean War in 1953) and its dependence on
Source: IISS, London.
Table 1. Comparative military spending of North Korea, South Korea
and Japan, 2000 (data in parentheses from 1999)
North Korea
South Korea
Japan
Population (m)
24.5
47
127
Per capita military
expenditure (US$)
95 (87)
263 (257)
351 (319)
Percentage of GDP
13.9 (14.3)
2.8 (3)
1 (0.9)
Military expenditure
(US$m) 2000
2 049 (2 100)
12 496 (12 088)
44 417 (40 383)
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the South for economic and humanitarian assistance are also likely to preclude such activities against
the South. Similarly Kim Jong Il, the DPRK’s head of state, has made an intensive effort to improve
relations with Japan—resulting in two visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to the DPRK, an agreement to
return Japanese hijackers residing in Pyongyang since the 1970s along with their families, and the
return of the Japanese abductees and their families. The DPRK’s non-involvement in terrorist activities
was acknowledged by the Clinton Administration, which was in the process of taking the DPRK off its
list of states that sponsor terrorism before it went out of office in 2001.
The real military threat from and to the DPRK
The military threat from the DPRK is that if attacked, even in the form of a “surgical strike” or
“limited” bombing campaign against its nuclear or other facilities, it would retaliate militarily. If attacked,
weak military capacity would not prevent retaliatory military action by the DPRK against South Korea—
where some 30,000 US troops are stationed. Seoul with its population of around 25 million is only
about 50km from the Korean border.
The DPRK has the capacity to mobilize millions of its military and population if it is attacked. It is
the DPRK’s mobilization capacity—not its military hardware—that could potentially cause devastation
if war broke out on the Peninsula. A determined march south by a mobilized North Korean population,
even in the face of undoubtedly punishing bombing from US and South Korean forces, would result in
human and economic catastrophe for South Korea. As the Rwandan genocide demonstrated, it is not
necessary to possess sophisticated weapons to kill half a million people in two or three weeks.
On the other hand, even the DPRK government does not know if a mobilized people and army
would continue to fight if war broke out. The population of North Korea is for the most part hungry
and poor, and it blames the party and government officials, not the United States, for the country’s
economic crisis. Nor does it view South Korea as the enemy. Large sections of the population also now
know that, contrary to what they were told by their education system and their media, South Korea is
a rich country and life chances are better in the South than the North. The North Korean population
could decide that the nationalist Korean project that is the essential foundation of the “Juche” philosophy
could easily be satisfied by integration with South Korea. Therefore war is not a policy option for the
DPRK government. Rather than mobilizing the people, North Korean policy makers know that military
conflict may provide the catalyst to undermine fatally the current DPRK regime.
Real threats to regional security
MARKETS, INEQUALITY AND THE SPILL-OVER EFFECTS
The real threats to regional security can best be understood as a result of a causal relationship
between the economic devastation faced by the North Korean population since the early 1990s and
the subsequent actual and potential threats to stability in neighbouring states from spill-over effects of
the rapid growth of unregulated primitive capitalism in the DPRK. Human (in)security analysis thus
illuminates the cause of the potential regional security crisis and by doing so challenges conventional
analysis of what constitutes the causes of concern in the Korean case.
The economic crisis that hit the DPRK with the loss of concessionary markets, cheap oil and
technology transfers from the ex-communist states with the end of the Cold War is well-known. What
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is less reported is the consequent marketization— without political liberalization—that has taken place
in the DPRK since the early 1990s. The state could no longer deliver food and all other economic and
social goods after the food crisis of the 1990s, when nearly a million people died of starvation and
malnutrition. The remaining 21 million survived through recourse to the primitive market that filled
the economic allocation and distribution vacuum.
The DPRK is now a nation of small and large business people. The state no longer provides
enough for any member of the population to survive without individual entrepreneurship. Yet, at the
same time, the state has not moved to create a regulatory framework to shape the workings of this
mass of private economic activity. Thus there is little distinction between what is legal and what is illegal,
what is legitimate and what is illegitimate. Corruption in this climate is simply a judgment made in terms
of personal ethics. Everything is permissible as the legal system does not recognize—except in the very
broad and basic legislation provided by the July 2002 “economic reforms”—that the foundations of
the economic structure have been transformed.
CROSS-BORDER ILLEGALITY AND PETTY CRIMINALITY
One consequence of the DPRK’s human security crisis is, as one North Korean residing in China
told me in March this year, “the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer”. The social
safety net cherished under the Kim Il Sung development project has all but disappeared. Inequality
and absolute poverty such as to keep the threat of starvation acute for probably the majority of North
Koreans propel various kinds of cross-border illegality: economic migration to China, trafficking in
women, armed robbery and night-time theft, and smuggling.
The 30,000 or so North Koreans residing illegally in China are generally pushed into illegal
migration by economic motives. Their actions are criminalized by both China and the DPRK, however,
and they risk severe punishment on their return to the DPRK if they are considered to have been
colluding with South Koreans and/or Christians in Yanbian, the border region that is home to China’s
Korean minority. Both groups are viewed by the North Korean authorities not as humanitarians, but as
provocateurs whose major aim is to overturn the North Korean regime.
Economic entrepreneurs make money out of trafficking girls and women as brides and prostitutes
in north-east China—where single women are in short supply and where Chinese women are increasingly
reluctant to enter into the hardships involved in rural living. So far, mainly small-scale cross-border
operators have been responsible for the trafficking. Family, friends and local connections arrange the
traffic—sometimes with connivance of the women. One North Korean woman who had introduced
another to a Chinese man said that “of course this is an insult to the woman and to the country [North
Korea]. But it is better than living without food to eat.”
Another consequence of the country’s continuing inability to feed its people and provide
meaningful economic opportunities for its population is the general rise in crime in the country and,
particularly important for regional stability, in the border area with China and Russia. Crime ranges
from the nightly forays into China of North Koreans living near the border to steal food and supplies to
the more sinister development of armed robberies on the Chinese side of the border. North Korean
soldiers, for instance, robbed a bank in the border town of Tumen in north-east China last year and
were caught by the Chinese police after they used the proceeds to buy and consume alcohol in China
instead of immediately returning to the DPRK. Violent crime and property theft are carried out by
small-scale operators and have not yet been linked to organized crime. Their prevalence is causing
concern among local Chinese authorities, however, as they have caused a sharp increase in personal
insecurity for local Chinese and Chinese Koreans.
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Finally, the DPRK’s human security crisis and lack of internal regulation has generated widespread
smuggling across the Chinese-North Korean border. Lumber is sold into China along with herbs and
mushrooms. Smuggling is almost institutionalized with North Korean local authorities, businesses as
well as individuals routinely carrying out cross-border trade in ways that aim to avoid Chinese and
North Korean taxation.
PEOPLE-SMUGGLING
Transnational organized criminal gangs have taken advantage of the DPRK’s human security crisis
in that it is Chinese “snake-heads” or people smugglers who transport North Koreans from China to
Seoul. This is a market-generated activity where the snake-heads, who have the resources and contacts
to make transnational operations between two and more countries possible, exchange their services
with North Koreans who agree to pay a large part of the resettlement allowance they receive from the
South Korean government once they are successfully located in Seoul.
Incidentally there are clear gender dimensions to this transnational criminal market. The snake-
heads prefer women clients as they consider that women are more likely to pay back the debt accrued.
This may be the reason disproportionate numbers of women are turning up in Seoul among the latest
waves of North Koreans who have actually reached South Korea.
THE REGIONAL EFFECTS OF TECHNICAL MELTDOWN
The lack of internal regulatory capacity in the DPRK is not confined to economic legislation. The
DPRK has no systematic technical arrangements for what is known in engineering parlance as “quality
assurance” in any of its industrial or energy sectors. The major train crash in the DPRK in February
2004 that killed dozens of schoolchildren was as much due to the DPRK’s inability to implement
regularized safety procedures as it was to individual human error. This lack of capacity permeates all
sectors. Its prevalence means that a nuclear accident is more likely than not given the recent resuscitation of
the DPRK’s nuclear reactors. The effects of a nuclear accident could not
be confined to the DPRK: South Korea, China, Russia and Japan would
suffer the consequences. A nuclear accident is a much more likely cause
of a regional nuclear crisis than the launch of a nuclear weapon.
THE FEAR O F US UNILATERALISM
A major unspoken worry of all governments in the region is the reluctance of the United States to
commit itself to achieving a diplomatic solution to the regional security crisis and the consequent fear of
unilateral US military intervention in the DPRK. The governments of the region have not been encouraged
by the American decision at the Six-Party Talks to read prepared statements and its failure to use the
opportunities for informal discussions with the North Koreans on the margins of the formal meetings.
In other words, they have been dismayed by the unwillingness of the United States to use the normal
mechanisms of diplomacy whose very aim is to achieve agreement between conflicting parties that by
definition do not share interests and values by way of compromise and trade-offs.
A nuclear accident is a much more
likely cause of a regional nuclear crisis
than the launch of a nuclear weapon.
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All the region’s states fear military intervention by the United States on the Peninsula. South
Korea fears the annihilation of Seoul and the crippling of its economy not to speak of the killing,
maiming and devastation that would be suffered by millions of Koreans. China does not want a war on
its borders—especially when it is making such profound efforts to develop its north-east. Neither does
it or Russia relish being drawn into a hot conflict with the United States. Public opinion in both countries
would be outraged if the United States even attempted a limited “surgical strike” against the North
Koreans—and both countries have friendship treaties with the DPRK, with China still formally committed
to some form of active support of the DPRK in times of war. Even Japan, whose alliance with the
United States forms the foundation of its foreign policy and its existence as a democratic state, has
given strong signals to the United States that it prefers conflict resolution through negotiation, not
confrontation.
The regional response
Most of the DPRK’s neighbours have been so concerned with the high-profile nuclear crisis and
the consequent fear of American unilateralism that they have not analysed human insecurities as a
cause of potential threats to regional stability in themselves. Only China has taken these new security
threats in any way seriously. Its approach has been to punish those caught engaged in criminality as
well as to step up its internal security surveillance procedures such as to try to identify North Koreans
residing in China without papers. Once identified, they are sent back to the DPRK. Publicly, China has
refused to cooperate with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in setting up screening mechanisms
to distinguish refugees from economic migrants. Instead it has insisted on a bilateral approach with
North Korea and has reiterated its official position that all North Koreans in China are economic migrants.
Concurrent with the official harsh approach, China has also taken a more flexible approach to
North Koreans seeking support in China. Despite the fact that it has deployed some 100,000 troops to
the border area, it has not militarized the still porous and open 1,000 mile border. There are still no
fences, barbed wire, military emplacements or demarcation lines except for the river that separates the
two countries. This means that in practice it tolerates North Koreans coming over the border at night to
obtain food from relatives or other sources. It has facilitated the transport of North Koreans who
invaded foreign embassies and consulates in Beijing and Shenyang to Seoul. It is also currently considering
recognizing the estimated 5,000 children born to mixed marriages of illegally resident North Koreans
and Chinese citizens.
Regional actors on the whole, however, have not taken seriously the potential threats to regional
stability derived from the continuing structural impetus to growth in cross-border illegality and criminality
arising from the DPRK human security crisis. No regional actor has addressed the potential consolidation
of transnational criminal networks in the border areas of China, Russia and the DPRK.
These subjects remain off the security agenda because of
the very fact that they contradict established discourse. The
“common knowledge” security paradigms that argue for the
fearsome nature of the North Korean military are so strong and
strengthened by every kind of cultural and ideological reinforcement that it becomes impossible to
“see” data that does not fit the pre-existing perceptions. One contributing factor is simply lack of
information reaching the public through the media or educational institutions.
And in many cases, keeping taboo subjects off the public agenda serves domestic political interests.
For example, it is far easier to persuade the Japanese public to support changes in that country’s
constitution to allow a more active role for Japanese military forces if the enemy can be shown as
These subjects remain off the security
agenda because of the very fact that they
contradict established discourse.
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demented, irrational, nearby and of imminent threat. It would be much harder to justify such changes
as part of a conformity to the reformulated Japanese-US strategic alliance that requires more pro-
active participation from Japan in regional and global military activities.
Regional cooperation as policy solution
The conventional approach to regional security analysis argues that there is little commonality
between the five major North-East Asian states such as to build a regional coordination mechanism. In
fact, there are a number of ways in which North-East Asians are economically and politically more
institutionally bound together than ever before. Rapid Chinese economic growth provides the meshing
factor—with Japan, South Korea and Russia looking for and obtaining trade, markets and investment
relationships with China so as to boost their own economic fortunes. The “ASEAN plus 3” formula has
brought Japan, China and South Korea together in a multilateral forum and all participants in the Six-
Party Talks are members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Five of the six—not including North
Korea—are members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum. In addition, the talks
themselves provide potential avenues of cooperation between the six parties and the possibility of
building more institutionalized cooperation mechanisms in the future.
By misconceiving nascent regional cooperation, the conventional wisdom rules out consideration
of what could be innovative but pragmatic solutions to the region’s security crisis. Multisectoral security
problems require fine-tuned analysis. These solutions also provide the possibility for trade-offs and
bargaining across sectors and countries, such as to provide multilateral solutions to the multifaceted
security dilemma of North-East Asia today. The Six-Party Talks decision to convene working groups
could, for instance, provide an acceptable forum to all parties to discuss the controversial issues of not
just nuclear weapons and missiles, but human rights and humanitarian issues as well as economic and
development matters.
It would not be very difficult to envisage a process akin to the Helsinki “basket” diplomacy where
security, economics and human rights issues were negotiated by the Cold War adversaries but progress
in each was not directly linked to simultaneous progress in all. Thus incremental negotiations provided
confidence-building exercises in themselves as well as substantive positive outcomes at the end of the
process. An analogous approach is feasible for North-East Asia by way of an extension of the Six-Party
Talks. It will, however, require a rejection of unicausal analysis and the conventional wisdom and an
adoption of security analysis that accepts the multidimensional nature of security threats in North-East
Asia and the subsequent possibilities of multilateral and multisectoral solutions.
Old and new security analyses
Facing the myths and realities of North-East Asia’s security dilemmas would bring advantages to
policy makers. The insecurity facing the North Korean government and its consequent decision to
advertise possession of a nuclear deterrent (whether based on a real or aspired for weapons capacity
is almost irrelevant in this context) provide part of the security puzzle of North-East Asia. Elite discourse
also, however, needs to recognize that focusing on the alleged military threat from North Korea to the
exclusion of all other factors defers the resolution of real security threats to regional stability, and
downplays other potentially dangerous conflicts between states and peoples in the region. Historical
antagonisms are not disappearing and, because they have little purchase in inter-elite political discussion
and are not the focus of any official attempts at conflict resolution, they are in many ways worsening.
54
two •  2005 NORTH-EAST ASIAN SECURITY
Old security analysis masks the serious but multidimensional nature of North Korea’s national
security problems. Real security threats come not from the DPRK as a military threat but derive from
generalized human insecurities generated by the breakdown of economic structures within the DPRK
and the resulting transborder spill-over effects. Innovative security analysis should identify these new
features of the regional socio-economic and political landscape such as to help policy makers build
common, more cooperative futures.
